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IS PUNISHMENT NECESSARY?*
JACKSON TOBY
Dr. Toby is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology in the College of Arts and
Sciences of Rutgers University. From 1959 to 1963, he served as a regular consultant to the Youth
Development Program of the Ford Foundation. Dr. Toby received the M.A. degree in ec aomics in
1947, the M.A. degree in sociology in 1949, and the Ph.D. degree in sociology in 1950 rom Harvard
University. He is author of Contemporary Society: Social Process and Social Structure in Urban In-
dustrial Societies (1964) and co-author (with Harry C. Bredemier) of Social Problems in America:
Costs and Casualties in an Acquisitive Society (1960), both published by John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Dr. Toby's articles have appeared in a number of leading professional journals.
To what extent does a "victim constituency" influence the incidence of punishment? What is the
deterrent value of punishment? What is its value as regards the morale of the law-abiding? Does
punishment have a role in the rehabilitation of offenders? In the following article, Professor Toby
considers these and related questions in the course of examining the currently general assumption
that punishment will completely give way to treatment and rehabilitation measures in the handling
of offenders.-EnrroR.
Of 11 contemporary textbooks in criminology
written by sociologists, ten have one or more
chapters devoted to the punishment of offenders.'
All ten include a history of methods of punish-
ment in Western society and, more specifically, a
discussion of capital punishment. Seven discuss
punishment in pre-literate societies. Seven include
theoretical or philosophical discussions of the
"justification" of punishment-usually in terms of
"retribution," "deterrence," and "reformation."
These theoretical analyses are at least as much in-
debted to law and philosophy as to sociology. Thus,
in considering the basis for punishment, three text-
books refer both to Jeremy Bentham and to Emile
Durkheim; three textbooks refer to Bentham but
not to Durkheim; and one textbook refers to
Durkheim but not to Bentham. Several textbook
writers express their opposition to punishment,
especially to cruel punishment. This opposition is
alleged to be based on an incompatibility of
punishment with scientific considerations. The
following quotation is a case in point:
"We still punish primarily for vengeance, or
* This article is a revised version of a paper presented
to the 1959 meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society.
I BARNES & TEETERS, Nzw HORIZONS IN CRMI-
NOLOGY (3d ed. 1959); CALDWEL, CRIMINOLOGY (1956);
CAVAN, CRIMINOLOGY (1955); ELLIOT, CRIME IN
MoDERN SocIETY (1952); KORN & McCoRan,
CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY (1959); RECKLESS, THE
CRnM PROBLEM (2d ed. 1955); SUTHERLAND & CRES-
SEY, PRINCILEs oF CRIMINOLOGY (5th ed. 1955);
TArT, CRIMNOLOGY (3d ed. 1956); TAPPAN, CRmE,
JUsTIcE AND CORRECnON (1960); VON HENTIG, CRIME:
CAUSES AND CONrrIONS (1947); WOOD & WAIrE,
CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT (1941).
to deter, or in the interest of a 'just' balance of
accounts between 'deliberate' evildoers on the
one hand and an injured and enraged society on
the other. We do not yet generally punish or
treat as scientific criminology would imply,
namely, in order to change antisocial attitudes
into social attitudes.
2
Most of the textbook writers note with satisfaction
that "the trend in modern countries has been
toward humanizing punishment and toward the
reduction of brutalities." 3 They point to the de-
creased use of capital punishment, the introduction
of amenities into the modem prison by enlightened
penology, and the increasing emphasis on non-
punitive and individualized methods of dealing
with offenders, e.g., probation, parole, psycho-
therapy. In short, students reading these textbooks
might infer that punishment is a vestigial carry-
over of a barbaric past and will disappear as
humanitarianism and rationality spread. Let us
examine this inference in terms of the motives
underlying punishment and the necessities of
social control.
THE URGE To PUNISH
Many crimes have identifiable victims. In the
case of crimes against the person, physical or
psychic injuries have been visited upon the victim.
In the case of crimes against property, someone's
property has been stolen or destroyed. In pressing
2 TAFT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 359.
RECKLESS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 450.
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charges against the offender, the victim may ex-
press hostility against the person who injured him
in a socially acceptable way. Those who identify
with the victim-not only his friends and family
but those who can imagine the same injury being
done to them-may join with him in clamoring for
the punishment of the offender. If, as has been
argued, the norm of reciprocity is fundamental to
human interaction, this hostility of the victim
constituency toward offenders is an obstacle to the
elimination of punishment from social life.' Of
course, the size of the group constituted by victims
and those who identify with victims may be small.
Empirical study would probably show that it varies
by offense. Thus, it is possible that nearly every-
one identifies with the victim of a murderer but
relatively few people with the victim of a black-
mailer. The greater the size of the victim con-
stituency, the greater the opposition to a non-
punitive reaction to the offender.
It would be interesting indeed to measure the
size and the composition of the victim constitu-
encies for various crimes. Take rape as an illustra-
tion. Since the victims of rape are females, we
might hypothesize that women would express
greater punitiveness toward rapists than inen and
that degrees of hostility would correspond to real
or imaginary exposure to rape. Thus, pretty young
girls might express more punitiveness toward
rapists than homely women. Among males, we
might predict that greater punitiveness would be
expressed by those with more reason to identify
with the victims. Thus, males having sisters or
daughters in the late teens or early twenties might
express more punitiveness toward rapists than
males lacking vulnerable "hostages to fortune."
- Such a study might throw considerable light on
the wellsprings of punitive motivation, particularly
if victimization reactions were distinguished from
other reasons for punitiveness. One way to explore
such motivation would be to ask the same re-
spondents to express their punitive predispositions
toward offenses which do not involve victims at all,
e.g., gambling, or which involve victims of a quite
different kind. Thus, rape might be balanced by an
offense the victims of which are largely male.
Survey research of this type is capable of ascertain-
ing the opposition to milder penalties for various
offenses. It would incidentally throw light on the
comparatively gentle societal reaction to white-
collar crime. Perhaps the explanation lies in the
'Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary
Sfatement, 25 Am. Soc. Rav. 161 (1960)..
difficulty of identifying with the victims of patent
infringement or watered hams. 5
TMn SOCmL CONTROL FUNCTIONS or
PUNISEMNT
Conformists who identify with the victim are
motivated to punish the offender out of some
combination of rage and fear. Conformists who
identify with the offender, albeit unconsciously,
may wish to punish him for quite different reasons.
Whatever the basis for the motivation to punish,
the existence of punitive reactions to deviance is an
obstacle to the abolition of punishment. However,
it is by no means the sole obstacle. Even though a
negligible segment of society felt punitive toward
offenders, it might still not be feasible to eliminate
punishment if the social control of deviance de-
pended on it. Let us consider, therefore, the
consequences of punishing offenders for (a) pre-
venting crime, (b) sustaining the morale of con-
formists, and (c) rehabilitating offenders.
Punishmnent as a Means of Crime Prevention
Durkheim defined punishment as an act of
vengeance. "What we avenge, what the criminal
expiates, is the outrage to morality."' But why is
vengeance necessary? Not because of the need to
deter the bulk of the population from doing like-
wise. The socialization process prevents most
deviant behavior. Those who have introjected the
moral norms of their society cannot commit crimes
because their self-concepts will not permit them to
do so. Only the unsocialized (and therefore
amoral) individual fits the model of classical
criminology and is deterred from expressing
deviant impulses by a nice calculation of pleasures
and punishmentsY Other things being equal, the
anticipation of punishment would seem to have
more deterrent value for inadequately socialized
members of the group. It is difficult to investigate
this proposition empirically because other moti-
vationally relevant factors are usually varying
simultaneously, e.g., the situational temptations"
confronting various individuals, their optimism
about the chances of escaping detection, and the
differential impact of the same punishment on
5 In this connection, it is well to recall that there is
less reluctance to steal from corporations than from
humans. See A. W. JONEs, LIFE, LiBERTY, AND PROP-
ERTY (1941).
6 DuiBin, TnE DrVIsION OF LABoR rN SociETn
89 (1947).
7 




individuals of different status.8 Clearly, though,
the deterrent effect of anticipated punishments is a
complex empirical problem, and Durkheim was not
interested in it. Feeling as he did that some crime
is normal in every society, he apparently decided
that the crime prevention function of punishment
is not crucial. He pointed out that minute grada-
tion in punishment would not be necessary if
punishment were simply a means of deterring the
potential offender (crime prevention). "Robbers
are as strongly inclined to rob as murderers are to
murder; the resistance offered by the former is not
less than that of the latter, and consequently, to
control it, we would have recourse to the same
means." 9 Durkheim was factually correct; the
offenses punished most severely are not necessarily
the ones which present the greatest problem of
social defense. Thus, quantitatively speaking,
murder is an unimportant cause of death; in the
United States it claims only half as many lives
annually as does suicide and only one-fifth the toll
of automobile accidents. Furthermore, criminol-
ogists have been unable to demonstrate a relation-
ship between the murder rate of a community and
its use or lack of use of capital punishment.
Most contemporary sociologists would agree
with Durkheim that the anticipation of punish-
ment is not the first line of defense against crime.
The socialization process keeps most people law
abiding, not the police-if for no other reason than
the police are not able to catch every offender. This
does not mean, however, that the police could be
disbanded. During World War II, the Nazis de-
ported all of Denmark's police force, thus providing
a natural experiment testing the deterrent efficacy
of formal sanctions.10 Crime increased greatly.
Even though punishment is uncertain, especially
under contemporary urban conditions, the possi-
bility of punishment keeps some conformists law-
abiding. The empirical question is: How many con-
formists would become deviants if they did not
fear punishment?
Punishment as a Means of Sustaining the Morale of
Conformists
Durkheim considered punishment indispensable
as a means of containing the demoralizing conse-
8 Toby, Social Disorganization and Stake in Con-
fortuity: Complmnentary Factors in the Predatory Be-
havior of Young Hoodlums, 48 J. Cxm. L., C. & P.S.
12 (1957).
9 Op. cit. supra note 6, at 88.
10 TIou..z, SYv M.NEDER UTEN POLITI (SEVEN
MON ns WITHOUT POLCE) (Copenhagen, 1945),
quoted in Christie, Scandinavian Criminology, 31
SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 101 (1961).
quences of the crimes that could not be prevented.
Punishment was not for Durkheim mere vindictive-
ness. Without punishment Durkheim anticipated
the demoralization of "upright people" in the face
of defiance of the collective conscience. He believed
that unpunished deviance tends to demoralize the
conformist and therefore he talked about punish-
ment as a means of repairing "the wounds made
upon collective sentiments."" Durkheim was not
entirely dear; he expressed his ideas in meta-
phorical language. Nonetheless, we can identify
the hypothesis that the punishment of offenders
promotes the solidarity of conformists.
Durkheim anticipated psychoanalytic thinking
as the following reformulation of his argument
shows: One who resists the temptation to do what
the group prohibits, to drive his car at 80 miles per
hour, to beat up an enemy, to take what he wants
without paying for it, would like to feel that these
self-imposed abnegations have some meaning.
When he sees others defy rules without untoward
consequences, he needs some reassurance that his
sacrifices were made in a good cause. If "the good
die young and the wicked flourish as the green bay
tree," the moral scruples which enable conformists
to restrain their own deviant inclinations lack social
validation. The social significance of punishing
offenders is that deviance is thereby defined as un-
successful in the eyes of conformists, thus making
the inhibition or repression of their own deviant
impulses seem worthwhile. Righteous indignation
is collectively sanctioned reaction formation. The
law-abiding person who unconsciously resents
restraining his desire to steal and murder has an
opportunity, by identifying with the police and
the courts, to affect the precarious balance within
his own personality between internal controls and
the temptation to deviate. A bizarre example of
this psychological mechanism is the man who seeks
out homosexuals and beats them up mercilessly.
Such pathological hostility toward homosexuals is
due to the sadist's anxiety over his own sex-role
identification. By "punishing" the homosexual, he
denies the latent homosexuality in his own psyche.
No doubt, some of the persons involved in the
administration of punishment are sadistically
motivated. But Durkheim hypothesized that the
psychic equilibrium of the ordinary member of the
group may be threatened by violation of norms;
Durkheim was not concerned about psychopatho-
logical punitiveness.
Whatever the practical difficulties, Durkheim's
" DUR-HEIM op. cit. supra note 6, at 108.
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hypothesis is, in principle, testable. It should be
possible to estimate the demoralizing impact of
nonconformity on conformists. Clearly, though,
this is no simple matter. The extent of demoraliza-
tion resulting from the failure to punish may vary
with type of crime. The unpunished traffic violator
may cause more demoralization than the un-
punished exhibitionist-depending on whether or
not outwardly conforming members of society are
more tempted to exceed the speed limit than to
expose themselves. The extent of demoralization
may also vary with position in the social structure
occupied by the conformist. Thus, Ranulf sug-
gested that the middle class was especially vulner-
able:
"[Tihe disinterested tendency to inflict punish-
ment is a distinctive characteristic of the lower
middle class, that is, of a social class living under
conditions which force its members to an extra-
ordinarily high degree of self-restraint and
subject them to much frustration of natural
desires. If a psychological interpretation is to
be put on this correlation of facts, it can hardly
be to any other effect than that moral indigna-
tion is a kind of resentment caused by the re-
pression of instincts."'2
Once the facts on the rate and the incidence of
moral indignation are known, it will become pos-
sible to determine whether something must be
done to the offender in order to prevent the demor-
alization of conformists. Suppose that research
revealed that a very large proportion of con-
formists react with moral indignation to most
violations of the criminal laws. Does this imply
that punishment is a functional necessity? Durk-
heim apparently thought so, but he might have
been less dogmatic in his approach to punishment
had he specified the functional problem more
clearly: making the nonconformist unattractive as
a role model. If the norm violation can be defined
as unenviable through some other process than by
inflicting suffering upon him, punishment is not
required by the exigencies of social control.
Punishment can be discussed on three distinct
levels: (a) in terms of the motivations of the so-
cietal agents administering it, (b) in terms of the
definition of the situation on the part of the person
being punished, and (c) in terms of its impact on
conformists. At this point I am chiefly concerned
with the third level, the impact on conformists.
Note that punishment of offenders sustains the
I RANUILr_, M oAL INDIGNATION AND MIDDLE-CLASS
PsYcHOLOGy 198 (Copenhagen, 1938).
morale of conformists only under certain condi-
tions. The first has already been discussed, namely
that conformists unconsciously wish to violate the
rules themselves. The second is that conformists
implicitly assume that the nonconformity is a re-
sult of deliberate defiance of society's norms. For
some conformists, this second condition is not met.
Under the guidance of psychiatric thinking, some
conformists assume that norm violation is the re-
sult of illness rather than wickedness. 3 For such
conformists, punishment of the offender does not
contribute to their morale. Since they assume that
the nonconformity is an involuntary symptom of a
disordered personality, the offender is automati-
cally unenviable because illness is (by definition)
undesirable. Of course, it is an empirical question
as to the relative proportions of the conforming
members of society who make the "wicked" or the
"sick" assumption about the motivation of the
offender, but this can be discovered by investiga-
tion.
In Western industrial societies, there is increas-
ing tendency to call contemporary methods of
dealing with offenders "treatment" rather than
"punishment." Perhaps this means that increasing
proportions of the population are willing to accept
the "sick" theory of nonconformity. Note, how-
ever, that the emphasis on "treatment" may be
more a matter of symbolism than of substance.
Although the definition of the situation as treat-
ment rather than punishment tends to be human-
izing-both to the offender and to the persons who
must deal with him-there are still kind guards and
cruel nurses. Furthermore, it would be an error to
suppose that punishment is invariably experienced
as painful by the criminal whereas treatment is
always experienced as pleasant by the psycho-
pathological offender. Some gang delinquents con-
sider a reformatory sentence an opportunity to
renew old acquaintances and to learn new delin-
quent skills; they resist fiercely the degrading sug-
gestion that they need the services of the "nut
doctor." Some mental patients are terrified by
shock treatment and embarrassed by group-
therapy.
What then is the significance of the increasing
emphasis on "treatment"? Why call an institution
for the criminally insane a "hospital" although it
bears a closer resemblance to a prison than to a
"Talcott Parsons has repeatedly suggested the
analogy between illness and criminality. See also Aubert
& Messinger, The Criminal and the Sick, 1 INQUIRY 137




hospital for the physically ill? In my opinion, the
increased emphasis on treatment in penological
thinking and practice reflects the existence of a
large group of conformists who are undecided as
between the "wicked" and the "sick" theories of
nonconformity. When they observe that the of-
fender is placed in "treatment," their provisional
diagnosis of illness is confirmed, and therefore they
do not feel that he has "gotten away with it." Note
that "treatment" has the capacity to make the
offender unenviable to conformists whether or not
it is effective in rehabilitating him and whether or
not he experiences it as pleasant. Those old-fash-
ioned conformists who are not persuaded by official
diagnoses of illness will not be satisfied by "treat-
ment"; they will prefer to see an attempt made to
visit physical suffering or mental anguish on the
offender. For them, punishment is necessary to
prevent demoralization.
Punishment as a Means of Reforming the Offender
Rehabilitation of offenders swells the number of
conformists and therefore is regarded both by hu-
manitarians and by scientifically minded penolo-
gists as more constructive than punishment. Most
of the arguments against imprisonment and other
forms of punishment in the correctional literature
boil down to the assertion that punishment is in-
compatible with rehabilitation. The high rate of
recidivism for prisons and reformatories is cited as
evidence of the irrationality of punishment.14 What
sense is there in subjecting offenders to the frustra-
tions of incarceration? If rehabilitative programs
are designed to help the offender cope with frustra-
tions in his life situation, which presumably were
responsible for his nonconformity, imprisoning him
hardly seems a good way to begin. To generalize
the argument, the status degradation inherent in
punishment makes it more difficult to induce the
offender to play a legitimate role instead of a non-
conforming one. Whatever the offender's origi-
nal motivations for nonconformity, punishment
adds to them by neutralizing his fear of losing
the respect of the community; he has already lost
it.
Plausible though this argument is, empirical re-
search has not yet verified it. The superior re-
habilitative efficacy of "enlightened" prisons is a
humanitarian assumption, but brutal correctional
systems have, so far as is known, comparable re-
14 Void, Does the Prison Reform? 293 ANsLS 42
(1954).
cidivism rates to "enlightened" systems. True,
the recidivism rate of offenders who are fined or
placed on probation is less than the recidivism rate
of offenders who are incarcerated, but this compari-
son is not merely one of varying degrees of punish-
ment. Presumably, more severe punishment is
meted out to criminals who are more deeply com-
mitted to a deviant way of life. Until it is demon-
strated that the recidivism rates of strictly com-
parable populations of deviants differ depending on
the degree of punitiveness with which they are
treated, the empirical incompatibility of punish-
ment and rehabilitation will remain an open ques-
tion.
Even on theoretical grounds, however, the in-
compatibility of punishment and rehabilitation can
be questioned once it is recognized that one may
precede the other. Perhaps, as Lloyd McCorkle and
Richard Kom think, some types of deviants be-
come willing to change only if the bankruptcy of
their way of life is conclusively demonstrated to
them. 5 On this assumption, punishment may be a
necessary preliminary to a rehabilitative program
in much the same way that shock treatment makes
certain types of psychotics accessible to psycho-
therapy.
It seems to me that the compatibility of punish-
ment and rehabilitation could be clarified (although
not settled) if it were considered from the point of
view of the meaning of punishment to the offender.
Those offenders who regard punishment as a de-
served deprivation resulting from their own mis-
behavior are qualitatively different from offenders
who regard punishment as a misfortune bearing no
relationship to morality. Thus, a child who is
spanked by his father and the member of a bopping
gang who is jailed for carrying concealed weapons
are both "punished." But one accepts the depriva-
tion as legitimate, and the other bows before su-
perior force. I would hypothesize that punishment
has rehabilitative significance only for the former.
If this is so, correctional officials must convince the
prisoner that his punishment is just before they can
motivate him to change. This is no simple task. It
is difficult for several reasons:
1. It is obvious to convicted offenders, if not to
correctional officials, that some so-called "crimi-
nals" are being punished disproportionately for
trifling offenses whereas some predatory business
men and politicians enjoy prosperity and freedom.
15 McCorkle & Kom, Resocialization Within Walls,
293 ANNALS 88 (1954).
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To deny that injustices occur confirms the cynical
in their belief that "legitimate" people are not only
as predatory as criminals but hypocritical to boot.
When correctional officials act as though there were
no intermediate position between asserting that
perfect justice characterizes our society and that it
is a jungle, they make it more difficult to persuade
persons undergoing punishment that the best ap-
proximation of justice is available that imperfect
human beings can manage.'
6
2. Of course, the more cases of injustice known
to offenders, the harder it is to argue that the con-
temporary approximation of justice is the best that
can be managed. It is difficult to persuade Negro
inmates that their incarceration has moral signifi-
cance if their life experience has demonstrated to
them that the police and the courts are less scrupu-
lous of their rights than of the rights of white per-
sons. It is difficult to persuade an indigent inmate
that his incarceration has moral significance if his
poverty resulted in inadequate legal representa-
tion. 7
3. Finally, the major form of punishment for
serious offenders (imprisonment) tends to generate
a contraculture which denies that justice has any-
thing to do with legal penalties.' That is to say, it
is too costly to confine large numbers of people in
isolation from one another, yet congregate confine-
ment results in the mutual reinforcement of self-
justifications. Even those who enter prison feeling
contrite are influenced by the self-righteous inmate
climate; this may be part of the reason recidivism
rates rise with each successive commitment. 9
In view of the foregoing considerations, I hy-
pothesize that punishment-as it is now practiced
in Western societies-is usually an obstacle to re-
habilitation. Some exceptions to this generalization
should be noted. A few small treatment institutions
have not only prevented the development of a self-
righteous contraculture but have managed to es-
tablish an inmate climate supportive of changed
values.'2 In such institutions punishment has re-
16 See the interesting discussions of human fallibility
in the works of Reinhold Neibuhr-e.g., Tir CHImREN
OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN or DARxN.ss (1950).
1 Trebach, The Indigent Defendant, 11 RurGEos L.
REv. 625 (1957).
18 For a discussion of the concept of contraculture, see
Yinger, Contraculture and Subculture, 25 Am. Soc. REV.
625 (1960).
1" Sellin, Recidivism and Maturation, 4 NAT'L PRO-
BATION AND PARoLE A.J. 241 (1958).
20 McComa, ELTAs & BxnYt, THim HiGi PzLs
SToRY (1958), and Empey & Rabow, Experiment in
habilitative significance for the same reason it has
educational significance in the normal family: it is
legitimate.
To sum up: The social control functions of
punishment include crime prevention, sustaining
the morale of conformists, and the rehabilitation of
offenders. All of the empirical evidence is not in,
but it is quite possible that punishment contributes
to some of these and interferes with others. Sup-
pose, for example, that punishment is necessary for
crime prevention and to maintain the morale of
conformists but is generally an obstacle to the re-
habilitation of offenders. Since the proportion of
deviants is small in any viable system as compared
with the proportion of conformists, the failure to
rehabilitate them will not jeopardize the social
order. Therefore, under these assumptions, socio-
logical counsel would favor the continued employ-
ment of punishment.
CONCLUSION
A member of a social system who violates its
cherished rules threatens the stability of that sys-
tem. Conformists who identify with the victim are
motivated to punish the criminal in order to feel
safe. Conformists who unconsciously identify with
the criminal fear their own ambivalence. If norm
violation is defined by conformists as willful, visit-
ing upon the offender some injury or degradation
will make him unenviable. If his behavior is defined
by conformists as a symptom of pathology they are
delighted not to share, putting him into treatment
validates their diagnosis of undesirable illness.
Whether he is "punished" or "treated," however,
the disruptive consequence of his deviance is con-
tained. Thus, from the viewpoint of social control,
the alternative outcomes of the punishment or
treatment processes, rehabilitation or recidivism,
are less important than the deviant's neutraliza-
tion as a possible role model. Whether punishment
is or is not necessary rests ultimately on empirical
questions: (1) the extent to which identification
with the victim occurs, (2) the extent to which
nonconformity is prevented by the anticipation of"
punishment, (3) what the consequences are for the
morale of conformists of punishing the deviant or
of treating his imputed pathology, and (4) the
compatibility between punishment and rehabilita-
tion.
Delinquency Reabilitation, 26 Am. Soc. REv. 679
(1961).
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